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TRANSFERS OF CORPORATE STOCK BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN KENTUCKY.
Section 2128 of the Kentucky Statutes reads, in part, as
follows:
"A gift, transfer or assignment of personal property between hus-
band and wife shall not be valid as to third persons unless the same
be in writing, and acknowledged and recorded as chattel mortgages are
required to be acknowledged and recorded, but the recording of any
such writing shall not make valid any such gift or assignment which
is fraudulent or voidable as to creditors or purchasers."
Assuming that a husband for a valuable 'consideration, and
while he is solvent, sells his wife certain shares of stock in a
Kentucky corporation, and indorses and delivers the certificate
to her, and assuming that she delivers said certificate to the cor-
poration and causes the corporation to issue new certificates
to her for said stock, can creditors of the husband thereafter
subject this stock to their claims against the husband, because
the transfer was not acknowledged and recorded? The problem
thus presented excludes all questions of fraud.
The statute by its terms applies to "personal property."
Ordinarily corporate stock is described as personal property.,
There is a very real difference, however, between tangible per-
sonal property on the one hand, and intangible personal prop-
erty on the other, and this difference has often been the subject
of judicial decision. 2 No general rule can be safely laid down
to the effect that "personal property" as used in statutes means
corporate stock, or other intangible property, or that such term
does not mean corporate stock and other intangible property.
The phrase "personal estate," as used in the statute gov-
erning the recording of mortgages, has no application to shares
1 lRkhorm Land Co. v. Childers, 30 Ky. L. R. 1121, 100 S. W. 222.
2Henderson v. Barrett's xr., 152 Ky. 648, 153 S. W. 992
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of stock or other intangible personal property.3 On the other
hand, the term "personal estate,"as used in the statutes with
reference to descent and distribution does apply to corporate
stock.4 Furthermore, the phrase "other personal property,"
as used in the exemption statutes, includes choses in action. 5
It is clear, therefore, that no general rule as to the meaning of
the phrase "personal property" can be laid down.
Did the legislature in enacting section 2128 of the Ken-
tucky Statutes mean to require that in order for transfers of
intangible personal property between husband and wife to be
valid as to third persons such transfers must be evidenced by
writing acknowledged and recorded? What was the purpose of
this provision? What situation did it undertake to meet?
Tim LEGISLAT VE INTEN-T
Assuming that this very statute has not been conclusively
construed by the Court of Appeals, the problem is to determine
that most elusive thing, the legislative intent. What did the
legislature mean when it used the phrase "personal property"
in enacting this very statute? In undertaking to ascertain this
intent, we shall apply two tests to the statute: 1. At the time
of the enactment of the statute, had the Court of Appeals con-
strued the phrase "personal property" as used in any previous
statute on the same subject, or in one so nearly analogous
that the legislature is to be presumed to have used the phrase
in the same sense in this statute? 2. Can we ascertain the
object intended to be accomplished by the statute and conclude
what construction will best advance that object?
Both of these tests are recognized as valuable aids in as-
certaining the legislative intent. The first test is well recog-
nized:
"Where a statute has been re-enacted in the same or substantially
the same terms, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar with
its construction and to have adopted it as part of the law, unless the
statute expressly provides for a different construction. So where
words and phrases employed in a new statute have been construed by
the courts to have been used in a particular sense in a previous statute
on the same subject, or on one analogous to it, they are presumed, in
3'pa7ding v. Paine's Admr., 5 Ky. L. R 391, 81 Ky. 416; Schuster
v. Jones, 22 Ky. L. R. 569; U. S. Bank v. Huth, 4 B. Mon. 423.4 Elkhorn Land Co v. Chizlders, 100 S. W. 222, 30 Ky. L. R. 112L
5MiZler v. Mahoney, 16 Ky. L. R. 799.
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the absence of a clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to be used
In the same sense In the new as in the previouz statute."8
The second test has also received approval:
"Every statute must be construed with reference to the object in-
tended to be accomplished by it. In order to ascertain this object it
Is proper to consider the occasion and necessity of its enactment, the
defect or evils in the former law, and the remedy provided by the
new one; and the statute should be given that construction which is
best calculated to advance its object, by suppressing the mischief and
securing the benefits intended. " '
It is obvious that the two questions must be considered
together. Prior constructions of other statutes are of no avail
here unless those statutes are analogous,' because we have seen
that there are prior constructions both ways. The only way to
ascertain whether the statutes construed in decisions rendered
prior to the passage of this statute are analogous is to compare
the object sought to be served by the statutes thus construed
with the object sought to be served by the statute in question.
The satutes provide that a mortgage on "personal estate,"
if recorded, is constructive notice to those dealing with the
mortgagor, in reliance upon his apparent ownership of the
mortgaged property. Prior to the passage of section 2128, it
was well settled in Kentucky that these mortgage recording
statutes had no application to mortgages on intangible personal
property."
The reasons why such mortages cannot be recorded are
stated by the court:
"Again, the policy which dictated the statutes is not applicable
to a chose in action or claim for a debt, as there is no such visible pos-
session of such claims or separation of the right in them from the
apparent ownership, which is caZculated to deceive creditors and pur-
chasers; and, indeed, for many years after the enactment of the early
statutes,. choses in action were not subject to the payment of debts,
nor could be reached coercively and so applied by a creditor. It is true
that the creditor has the possession ef the evidence of the debt, if the
promise or undertaking be reduced to writing, if not, he has no visi-
ble possession of even that. But he has no visible possession of prop-
erty or money which may be seen and looked to by the creditor for the
payment of his debt, but of the right only to demand money, valuable
or worthless, according to the condition of the debtor. He may assign
such evidence of debt, absolutely, conditionally, in trust or in mort-
gage, by an indorsement on the same, and such indorsements have
6 36 Cyc. 1153.
736 Cyc. 1110.
SU. S. Bank, et al. v. Huth, 4 B. Mon. 423.
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never been deemed necessary to be recorded. To require them to be
recorded, if they assumed the character of an assignment in trust or
mortgage, would embarrass commerce by checking the negotiability
and circulation of such paper."
It is also held that a mortgage upon shares of stock does
not come within the provisions of the recording statutes which
refer to personal estate.9 In Spalding v. Paine's Administrator
the court takes the position that because of the very nature of
intangible property a mortgage, though recorded, cannot, as a
practical matter, furnish the protection which the recording
statutes were meant to furnish.
"These certificates of stock are in the pockets of the owner, and go
with him where he may happen to locate as choses in action, or evi-
dence of his right without any means on the part of those with whom
he proposes to deal on the faith of such a security of ascertaining
whether or not this stock is in pledge or mortgaged to others. He finds
the name of the owner on the books of the company as a subscriber of
paid-up stock amounting to 180 shares, with the certificates in his
possession; pays for these certificates their full value, and has the
transfer to him made on the books of the company, thereby obtaining
a perfect title. What other inquiry is he to make so as to make his
investment certain and secure? Where is he to look in order to ascer-
tain whether or not this stock has been mortgaged? The chief office
of the company may be at one place today and at another tomorrow.
The owner may have no fixed or permanent abode, and with his notes
in one pocket and certificates of stock in another, and the one evi-
dencing the extent of his interest in the stock of the corporation, the
other his right to money owing him by his debtor, we are asked to say
that the mortgage is effectual as to the one and inoperative as to the
other."
Furthermore, the court holds that if the recording statutes
should be construed to cover intangible property, such construc-
tion would unreasonably interfere with commercial transactions
based upon the ready transfer of such intangibles.
"We find no precedent in this State sustaining the views presented
by the appellant, and, as suggested by the counsel for the appellee,
much of the business of the country is conducted on the faith of the
pledge of such stock as collaterals, and to adjudge that the holder of
the stock by transfer on the books of the corporation or by endorse-
ment and delivery by the owner is subordinate in his claim to the
mortgage, upon the doctrine of constructive notice, would paralyze
trade and open a wide field for the fraudulent disposition of such val-
uable interests at the expense of honest and confiding purchasers."
It is clear that the purpose of the mortgage recording stat-
utes construed in these cases was to protect those dealing with
owners of the property in reliance on their ownership.
95 Ky. L. R. 391, 81 Ky. 416.
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The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has a number of times
construed section 2128, and an examination of those decisions
will indicate whether that section had an object similar to that
of the mortgage recording statutes just referred to. In More-
bead's Administrator v. Mayfield,lO the plaintiff's intestate had
a policy of insurance on his own life, payable to his estate, and
by an unrecorded instrument, transferred it to his wife. After
his death the transfer was attacked by his creditors. The wife's
rights to the proceeds of the policy were sustained because the
transfer did not deplete the estate of the transferor. The court
said:
"Counsel for appellee suggests that this policy of life insurance,
or, indeed, any chose in action is not intended to be included in section
2128, supra, as personal property, and cites authority holding that a
mortgage of choses in action are not recordable instruments. While
there is force in this position, we do not think it necessary to a de-
cision of this case to determine the question as to what particular
kinds of property are embraced in the term "personal property," as
used in the statute. We think the statute meant to include property
of a tangible, substantial nature or right, having at the time an ascer-
tainable value, and thus an applicable part of the husband's estate.
We do not think the statute includes any mere possibility, expectancy
or contingency, but its aim and purpose is to cover some kind of
property that, at least, a creditor might subject by attachment to his
debt, or that would pass by a deed of general assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors."
In MoWethy v. McCriglt,'1 a husband gave his wife certain
bonds. After his death his heirs sought to require the wife to
account for the bonds because the transfer to her was not in
writing or recorded. The court held that the transfer was valid
as between the parties -thereto.
"It will be found from a careful examination of the opinions in
these cases that they recognize the validity, as between husband and
wife, of a gift of personal property from one to the other by word of
mouth and manual delivery, notwithstanding the provision of the
statute which requires that in order to make such a gift valid as to
third persons it must be in writing, duly acknowledged and recorded."
And it further held that it was only invalid as to purchasers
or creditors, and that the heirs could not upset it.
"In our opinion the appellee is not, in the meaning of the statute,
a third person having the right to complain of the gift of the bonds
to appellant by decedent. . . . If the gift to appellant of the bonds
in question had been by a writing from the donor, duly signed, ac-
10109 Ky. 51.
141 Ky. 816.
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knowledged and recorded, appellee would not have been in any
way affected thereby. Notice to her of the gift was unnecessary; having
nb interest as heir at law of the donor in the bonds given appellant
and no right to complain of the gift, she was not a third person to
whom the statute required that the notice, furnished by the recorded
transfer of the bonds, be given; nor could she as heir at law of the
donor have brought suit to cancel the writing or annul the gift."
In Jones v. L-owisville Tobacco Warehonse Company.' 2 a
wife rented her farm to her husband. He raised a crop of to-
bacco thereon and she had a lien on said crop to secure the
payment of her rental both by virtue of her rental contract and
by virtue of the statutes. The husband transferred the tobacco
to his wife, and she shipped it to the warehouse company which
sold it. The warehouse company held the proceeds in payment
of pre-existing indebtedness from the husband to the company.
The wife sued the warehouse company for the proceeds of the
tobacco, and it contended that the transfer of the tobacco from
the husband to the wife was invalid because not recorded. The
court denied this contention, and in so doing said:
"While as between husband and wife, such contracts must be in
writing to affect third persons, by the expression it is meant that
others may deal with the former owner on the faith of his ostensible
ownership unaffected by secret transfers. The provision as to recorda-
tion of the contract is to give a notice of the changed title. Obviously,
if the party dealing with it knows equally well from other sources that
the title is in the wife, but he buys from the husband, knowing that
the wife is ignorant of the transaction, he is not the kind of 'third
person' intended to be protected by the statute. The statute aims at
promoting honesty, not trickery, and is meant to enlarge, not to re-
strict, married women's property and contractual rights. In ought to
be given a liberal construction to effectuate the legislative purpose.
The transaction between husband and wife was not meretricious. The
transaction itself was valid; the only thing lacking was the publicity
necessary to protect third persons who might deal with it. The pos-
session by the wife was of itself notice that she had some sort of
-claim upon the property. If her possession was obtained in fact by
reason of the transfer of the tobacco in satisfaction of her lien, it pre-
served her lien, independent of the statute, as against all the hus-
band's creditors who had notice of the facts; and her possession was
of itself notice of the facts."
In Fogarty v. Nea,' 3 a resident of Kentucky executed a
note to a resident of Oklahoma, which note was secured by a
lien on Kentucky real estate. The payee endorsed and deliv-
ered the note to his wife, but without notifying the maker, the
payee collected the note from the maker. The wife then sued
'135 Ky. 824.
201 Ky. 85.
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the maker, and he defended on the ground that he had paid the
note to the husband, and that the transfer of the note from the
husband to the wife was invalid because it was not acknowledged
and recorded. The court sustained the transfer, on the ground
that the transfer had taken place in Oklahoma, and the statute
in question had no extra-territorial effect. It declined to pass
on the question whether the statute had any application to the
transfer of a note. It referred to the statute in question as
one "dealing solely with the fraudulent transfer of property
between husband and wife." The unhappy maker who had to
pay the note twice was in a position to call for the court's sym-
pathetic consideration. By failing to demand the surrender of
the note when he paid the husband he created a situation which
resulted in his having to pay it again. Not even his unfortunate
plight was sufficient to induce the court to apply the statute
to the transfer of a note.
From these decisions it seems clear that the statute in ques-
tion was really meant to protect persons dealing with ostensible
owners of property against fraudulent transfers of that prop-
erty to the transferor's husband or wife. If A owns a horse,
that fact is generally known to those in the vicinity, and credit
is extended to him in reliance thereon. After obtaining the
credit, he can very easily claim that he has sold the horse to
his wife. There is no visible change of possession, and it is
very difficult for a third person to prove fraud, or lack o con-
sideration. This was the situation the statute was designed to
meet. This is shown in the case of Eberhardt v. Wahl,14 infra,
where the court said:
"It was recognized that their relation was one affording amplest
opportunities for the practicing of fraud against creditors of either,
unless their dealings with respect to their property were made the
subject of public record. As they generally live together and use each
other's property in common, there will be no visible change of pos-
session to indicate a change of ownership. Persons crediting the for-
mer real owner might then be misled into believing that no change
in the title had occurred, and upon the face of such apparent condition
give credit where there was not property to support it."
It was only intended to upset transfers which were preju-
dicial to those dealing with the transferor, in reliance on his
apparent ownership. The mortgage recording statutes provide
14124 Ky. 223.
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that a mortgage shall not be valid as to purchasers or creditors
unless acknowledged and recorded. They are designed for a
very similar purpose, that is, to protect those dealing with the
apparent owners of property against secret claims by third
persons. Also, of course, they were to rotect the rights of
bona fide mortgagees. If the purpose of the statutes is similar
then two conclusions follow: 1. When the legislature passed
section 2128, it is presumed to have been familiar with the es-
tablished rule that the phrase "personal estate" or "personal
property" in recording statutes does not include intangibles ;";
and 2. If the purpose of the statutes is similar, the authorities
construing the phrase "personal estate" in the recording stat-
utes are persuasive of the meaning of the phrase "personal
property" in section 2128.
The court says in the cases of U. S. Bank v. Hut., and
Spalding v. Paine's Adnr., that the phrase "personal estate"
does not mean intangible personal estate, because to construe
the statute to apply to intangibles would not meet the evil at
which the statute was directed, but would unreasonably hamper
commerce. The same may be said as to section 2128.
It is said, however, that the case of Eberhardt v. Wat's
Admr.,' 6 is a direct decision that section 2128 does apply to the
transfer of corporate stock. A husband executed two notes to
a bank. On one of these notes he pledged his own stock, on
another he pledged his wife's stock. His wife undertook to pay
the note upon which her stock was pledged. By error of the
bank, the note secured by the husband's stock was marked paid.
The error being discovered, the husband pledged his stock, which
had thus been released, with his wife, to secure her against loss
by reason of her paying off this note. A creditor of the husband
sought to subject this stock which had thus been released from
the bank's lien to his claim. The court said that the arrange-
ment by which the husband pledged his stock to his wife was
in violation of the statute, but it held that the bank had a valid
lien on the husband's stock to secure its debt; the wife, by reason
of paying that debt, was subrogated to the bank's lien on the
stock without regard to any agreement which she may have had
with her husband, and her claim to a lien on the stock released
1536 Cyc. 1153.
I 124 Ky. 223.
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by her payment of her husband's debt was superior to that of
the attaching creditor. So far it will be seen that the case is
not a decision on the question at all. However, after the trans-
actions above mentioned, the note secured by the wife's stock
was still in the bank. She claimed that her husband had agreed
that she might hold the stock released by the bank, not only to
secure the repayment of the money she had paid the bank, but
also to secure her against loss by reason of the pledging of her
own stock on the other note. The court held this much of the
agreement invalid, and to this extent the case is authority for
the proposition that section 2128 applies to the transfer of
corporate stock.
The case does not indicate that the court considered the
analogy of Spalding v. Paine's Admr., and the U. S. Bank v.
Huth. That the Court of Appeals does not regard the case as
settled is shown by its opinion in Fogarty v. Neal,'1 where it
specifically declined to pass on the applicability of section 2128
to the transfer of a promissory note, as it had theretofore de-
clined in the case of the transfer of the insurance policy in
Morehead v. Mayfield.i8
CONTEAPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION
No test of statutory construction is more often employed
than that of contemporaneous construction. This statute has
been in effect for more than thirty years and it is confidently
asserted by lawyers of large practice, extending over this entire
period of thirty years, that probably no transfer of corporate
stock between husband and wife has ever been recorded in the
state of Kentucky in compliance with this statute. Numberless
transfers have no doubt been made, and the fact that the bar of
the State has not regarded a compliance with this statute as
necessary is entitled to weight when considering that question.
APPLICATION OF SECTION 545, KENTUCKY STATUTES
Section 545 provides for the transfer of shares of stock
upon the corporate books. It has been suggested that a com-
pliance with this statute in a measure serves the purpose sought
17201 Ky. 85.
-5109 Ky. 51.
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to be served by section 2128. This is not the case, because no
one is entitled to rely upon the corporate books except the cor-
poration itself. A transfer made without registration upon the
corporate books is valid against all the world, except the cor-
poration, including attaching creditors of the transferor. In
Thurber v. Crump,19 the court said:
"Transfers of stock in corporations organized under chapter 56
of the General Statutes, are valid, not only between the parties but as
against creditors, although not entered upon the books of the company.
The provision of the statute requiring such transfers to be made upon
the books of the company is for the protection of the corporation and
purchasers and not for the protection of creditors of the stockhohers,
the books of the company not being open to the inspection of the
To the same effect are Husband v. Lirehan,20 and Stowe v.
Harvey.21
The title to stock is in no way affected by the transfer or
failure to transfer same upon the corporate books.
THE DuTY OF A CORPOlirTON
If it be true that section 2128 requires that transfers of
corporate stock between husband and wife be acknowledged
and recorded, is it the duty of the corporation, when requested
to transfer stock, to inquire whether it is being transferred from
husband to wife, and to exercise care that no such transfers be
registered on the corporate books unless it has been recorded in
the county clerk's office? This inquiry is not fanciful. If a
corporation transfers stock without right, it may in some in-
stances be required to answer to the transferee and also to
recognize the original owner as a stockholder.
In St. Romes v. Cotton Press CO.,22 an agent of the widow
who owned stock in the defendant corporation, presented the
certificates and induced the corporation to transfer the stock.
It was thereafter transferred from time to time to innocent
purchasers. The court held that the agent exceeded his powers
in causing this transfer, and that the corporation was abso-
lutely liable to recognize the widow as the owner of the number
"86 Ky. 408.
S168 Ky. 304.
- 241 U. S. 199, 60 L. Ed. 952.
=127 U. S. 614.
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of shares of stock thus wrongfully transferred, and inferen-
tially held that the corporation was also bound to recognize the
rights of the innocent transferees of this stock. The same
thing was held in Telegrapb Co. v. Davenport,2 3 where the
transfer was made through means of forgery by an agent of the
real owner of the stock.
The husband or wife transferee would acquire a good title
subject only to attack by the transferor's creditors.24 The
transferee could no doubt give a good title to an innocent pur-
chaser by endorsing and delivering the certificate to such pur-
chaser. No doubt the corporation would be compelled to recog-
nize the innocent purchaser and it might conceivably be held to
answer to the wronged creditor of the transferor. On the other
hand, the corporation could answer that the unrecorded transfer
was merely voidable, not void, and that no liability attaches to
a corporation for registering a voidable transfer, and that a
corporation has no right to inquire into the validity of the
transfer between parties. If the owner has endorsed and de-
livered the certificates to the transferee, the corporation must
register the transfer and is not liable therefor though the trans-
fer is illegal as between the parties thereto.25
J. VERSR CONNER.
Louisville, Ky.
297 U. S. 369.
24McWethy v. Mcright, 141 Ky. 816.
'Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., vol 6, p. 6412; Machen on Corporations,
sec. 934.
